By Jonathan Selling

As China’s interest in the MENA region has increased, its military has begun to play a more prominent role in the region. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s military, has increased its presence in the region over the last decade. While nowhere near as common as the United States military, the PLA is showing signs of more consistent interest in the region. In this article, I will cover the growing presence that the PLA has in the region and its objectives in the Middle East.

While the PLA is new to the region, Chinese military equipment is not. In the realm of military sales, China has long had a presence in the Middle East, dating back to the 1980s. Given its willingness to sell weapons with little regard to politics, China became a popular supplier to the armies in the region, one that was not concerned with how the equipment would be used. Despite this, China was overall still a minor player in the arms industry and was not able to challenge the dominance of more established arms suppliers from Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

Currently, China’s entire deployment to the region is almost entirely restricted to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and at this time the topic of military deployments is more of a naval one, rather than the entirety of the military. This is normal for many countries, as navies offer the ability to project power and maintain a presence in the region without the need for costly deployments. Even without the PLA’s base in Djibouti, it is not difficult for the PLAN to sail from China to the region and loiter for a few months.

At times, the PLA Ground Forces have been involved in the UN’s peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. Forces have been deployed intermittently since 2006. This represents the only deployments of the Ground Forces in the region at all. The Air Force has been completely absent from the region.

China’s only current permanent deployment in the region is a naval flotilla, which consists of three ships that are deployed to the Gulf of Aden at all times. The flotilla usually consists of two destroyers and an accompanying supply ship. This deployment has been ongoing since 2008 and originated with China’s participation in multinational anti-piracy operations. While this small flotilla is perfect for anti-piracy operations, it is much too small to seriously contest the waters of the Middle East, as it is overshadowed by numerous countries in the region and is no match for the massive American naval presence. Elsewhere in the region, the Navy makes frequent passage through the waters, but there are no other permanent deployments.

In March of 2011 China successfully evacuated around 36,000 of its citizens from Libya as the country descended into war. This was seen as a great success as China had become worried about the safety of its citizens as it encouraged them to go abroad for economic reasons. This is a common fear among nations, and most countries think about how to evacuate their citizens in a crisis. In the ’90s, China did not have this capability, and at times had had to rely on foreign nations to safeguard its citizens. The ability of the PLAN to evacuate expatriates if needed was seen as an essential development of the Navy and a driver for much of the Navy’s modernization.

The Navy also maintains a presence in the region to ensure that oil keeps flowing to China. China imports most of its oil from the Middle East, and its economy would be severely curtailed by an interruption in imports. The PLAN serves as a guarantee that China can keep tankers sailing towards China in a crisis. While the PLAN’s small presence in the region is nowhere near enough to contest the waters in the event of a U.S.-China war, it is enough to deter terrorism or opportunistic attacks by nearby nations.

China’s first foreign military base in Djibouti is a significant step forward for the PLA. It allows the PLA to resupply in the MENA region without sailing back to China and allows for a more permanent naval presence to be stationed. In the future, the base could also aid China in power projection if China decides to embark on a large military expedition. Djibouti is also a focal location beyond the Chinese naval base, as both the United States and Japan have bases in the country.

There is also talk that China will construct another base at Gwadar, Pakistan, although there is no official announcement about this base. As part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese money paid for the port at Gwadar to be greatly expanded and renovated. Given the strategic location and Pakistan’s close relationship with China, there is much speculation that this will eventually become a naval base. This base would provide an important safe haven for Chinese Navy vessels and is ideally located as a stopover point between China and the base in Djibouti.

China’s limited presence in the MENA region is by design. China sees the United States’ long-term military presence in the region as a lack of achievement– and China is determined to avoid making the same mistakes. Furthermore, China’s political goals in the region are very limited, which reduces the need for deployed soldiers.

While there are worries by some that China is seeking to displace the United States as the dominant military power in the Middle East, these worries are simply not grounded in reality. The United States Navy’s presence in the region is many times larger than that of the PLAN’s, and in the event of a conflict between the two, the PLAN would be hopelessly outmatched.

For now, there is no indication that China has much interest in increasing its military presence further in the Middle East. Chinese interests in the region remain mostly economic in nature and there is a strong aversion to getting involved with Middle Eastern politics. This comes from both the longstanding Chinese foreign policy doctrine of noninterference, the belief that the United States has erred in wading into the region, and a determination to avoid making the same mistake.

Further dispelling worries about the PLA dominating the Middle East, is the limited and mission-specific Chinese military presence in the region; which fits with the current objectives of the Chinese government. China’s military presence is normal for such a large nation, and if it wasn’t for concerns about China in other areas, the PLA’s presence in the region would not raise any alarms. Looking ahead, it is doubtful that China will significantly increase its military presence in the region absent a major change in the security situation in the region. If there was a realistic threat to the passage of oil to China, the PLAN would likely step in to begin escorting tankers through the region, much like the United States Navy did during the so-called ‘Tanker War’. Otherwise, it’s hard to see any reason that would lead to a significant rise in Chinese military presence, and it is very hard to imagine a situation where air or ground forces are deployed. China is not attempting to contest the waters of the Middle East but is simply trying to guarantee the security of its own interests in the region.