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Fission and Vision: Russia's Nuclear Diplomacy in the SWANA Region

Al Fusaic

By Seera Sohal

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As global temperatures rise and energy demands surge, countries are searching for alternative ways to fuel their power grids to not only meet their citizen’s needs but to also boost their own economies. As relying on traditional oil and gas production grows increasingly unsustainable, many states look to alternative sources to diversify their energy supply. Enter the potential of nuclear energy—which, per governments, international organizations, and scientists—is regarded to be incredibly safe, clean, and reliable. Nuclear energy generates large-scale electricity with lower emissions and enjoys a more reliable output with less land usage than wind and solar power. Several countries have adopted nuclear energy into their power grids already--the United States receives almost 20% of its electricity from nuclear plants which comprises almost 50% of its green energy sources, China is the second-largest generator of nuclear energy worldwide, and France draws 70% of its energy from nuclear power. Similarly, in the SWANA region Türkiye and Egypt are looking to add this source to their arsenal to meet their growing energy needs, and to develop their first nuclear plants, they have turned to a leading country in this field: Russia.

Why Russia?

When looking to establish civilian nuclear capabilities, states have several partners to choose from—such as the United States, China, and South Korea—yet Russia holds an advantage with its history of pioneering the development of such technology. Before its invasion of Ukraine, Russia was involved in around half of the world’s nuclear energy agreements and supplies nuclear technologies to Africa, Asia, the SWANA Region, and Latin America. Moscow’s nuclear influence endures global sanctions, and Rosatom—its state-owned atomic energy company—accounts for 70% of current worldwide reactor constructions, including operations in the SWANA Regiont and Asia. In fact, Rosatom’s 2022 exports surpassed $10 billion, and its schedule of worldwide orders for the next decade totals $200 billion. As of June 2024, Russia manages 36 nuclear reactors with a total capacity of 26,802 MWe with 4 more in construction.

Moscow’s preeminence is largely attributed to its all-inclusive packages that provide reactor construction services, related training and safety support, adherence to non-proliferation standards, and flexible payment plans—rendering it the sole global supplier of all the required components for a nuclear energy program. When combined with government-backed credit lines and handling of spent nuclear fuel, Russia presents itself as a promising partner. While the SWANA Region eyes Russian cooperation for Moscow’s comprehensive services, Moscow is interested in expanding its nuclear portfolio to the region for economic and political gain. With its invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s historical customers in Europe and Central Asia look to reduce their dependence on Russian energy; to overcome these economic consequences as well as international sanctions, Russia looks to increase its nuclear cooperation and find lucrative customers in countries facing rising energy demand such as Egypt and Türkiye.

Russia’s Nuclear History with Iran

Beyond Moscow’s historical role and expertise in the nuclear energy field, SWANA states find assurance in Rosatom’s construction of the region’s first civilian nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran. Iran’s push for nuclear energy dates back to 1957, when the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi sought to modernize Iranian energy capabilities through the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Several American and European companies expressed interest in this project due to its potential for market expansion, and Tehran ultimately partnered with Germany’s Kraftwerk Union—a subsidiary of the Siemens technology conglomerate—in November 1974. However, the company withdrew from the project following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, leaving the Bushehr NPP’s two reactors 50% and 85% complete. The subsequent Parliament signed nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia, and in 1995, officially contracted Atomstroyexport, a Rosatom subsidiary, to complete the Bushehr plant.

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Although the plant is now efficiently and economically successful, it faced several operational challenges along the way. Atomstroyexport initially struggled with documenting the unfamiliar equipment left behind by Germany, but made progress by manufacturing reactor components, constructing in compliance with IAEA safeguards, and integrating some German parts into its overall design. Rosatom sent its first shipment of nuclear fuel to Bushehr in December 2007, completed its eighth and final delivery in January 2008, and began loading the reactors with fuel in August 2010. While the Bushehr NPP was due to start up in February 2011, one of its four primary cooling pumps from the initial German construction failed. The plant later joined the national grid in September 2011, although its first commercial operation experienced technical delays until September 2013. Later that year, Rosatom transferred control of the plant to Iranian staff—who had previously operated the site alongside Russian specialists—per the project’s contract. 

Now, the Bushehr reactor produces 6-7 TWh/yr (1 TW = 1,000 GW) and saves 1.6 million tons of oil annually for Iran, therefore allowing Tehran to trade these resources for hard currency—in 2019, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) estimated that the Bushehr plant allowed for annual oil savings of $660 million. Rosatom is currently developing two further units at Bushehr—and potentially six more in the future—which the AEOI estimates will further reduce oil consumption by 22 million barrels per year, equating to $1.3 billion in savings. For SWANA countries looking to diversify and dynamize their economies, Rosatom’s successful projects, both internationally and now regionally, make it an all the more appealing partner.

The Economic Promise of Turkish Nuclear Energy Plans

After Iran’s Bushehr NPP, Rosatom began its next SWANA project in Akkuyu, a location within southern Türkiye near the Mediterranean Sea. Türkiye has sought nuclear energy since the 1960s but did not secure any partnerships due to its internal political unrest as well as proliferation concerns. However, as Ankara’s economy grows and energy demand soars, its energy security poses an issue of national importance. As Türkiye lacks sufficient natural resources to satisfy its energy demands, it has historically depended on imports from numerous countries, although Russia remains a central player. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Ankara has become Moscow’s third-largest energy consumer, doubled its imports of Russian oil and coal, and set records for its bilateral oil trade. To address this question of energy security, Türkiye signed an agreement with Rosatom in 2010 to establish its first nuclear power plant at Akkuyu.  

The economic benefits of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant explain Türkiye’s long-standing push for nuclear energy. Per the Turkish National Energy Plan, Ankara hopes for its nuclear plants to generate 11.1% of its overall energy production by 2030. Its first project site, the Akkuyu NPP, is set to have a capacity of 4,800 MWe; once completed, it is expected to employ 4,000 Turks and contribute $50 billion to the Turkish GDP throughout its life cycle. The Akkuyu NPP is currently a major employment hub in its region, and fuels localized economies through its network of 400 Turkish companies that provide a vast array of production equipment, thereby granting local companies experience with nuclear energy materials and manufacturing. As Türkiye’s energy needs rise yearly by 5-6%, the Akkuyu NPP is key to generating electricity for over 12 million customers in 10 of its 81 provinces, a figure encompassing both civil and corporate use.

Beyond the economic benefit, provisions of Rosatom’s contract raise concerns for Türkiye’s energy dependency. The Akkuyu NPP is financed, built, and fully operated by Rosatom through a unique Build-Own-Operate agreement. Under these terms, Rosatom holds operational control over the plant’s nuclear fuel cycle and personnel in exchange for a set electricity price over the next 15 years. The plant is set to operate for 60 years, with the possibility of a 20-year extension based on the decision of Rosatom’s governing board. While similar projects usually follow a Build-Operate-Transfer structure, the Akkuyu NPP agreement lacks measures for transferring control to a Turkish company in the foreseeable future. Until then, Rosatom holds full authority and autonomy over a nuclear plant in a NATO country, sparking security concerns for the alliance’s member-states. Additionally, while the Akkuyu NPP will assist Türkiye’s energy diversification, Ankara will still remain reliant on Moscow for all aspects of the plant’s operations, including areas such as material transport, technical support, and even regulatory oversight.

Türkiye aspires to be a regional energy nexus, diversify its resources, and meet its growing domestic power demand. To do so, Ankara has been eyeing nuclear energy capabilities for decades, due to its affordable, climate-friendly, and reliable characteristics. While Türkiye’s long-time energy partner Russia develops its first nuclear power plant, contract stipulations raise concern on whether it will truly allow Türkiye—a NATO country—to ease its dependency on Russian energy for the decades that follow.

The Potentials & Challenges of Nuclear Energy in Egypt 

Similar to Türkiye, Egypt seeks civilian nuclear energy capabilities to meet the needs of its growing population, although its contract with Rosatom also sparks concern about long-term Russian dependency and financial risks. Egypt—with a population above 100 million—experiences a growth in energy demand by about 4-7% per year, prompting Cairo to look to nuclear energy to better meet its domestic needs. prevent electricity outages and supply energy to its population of 100+ million people. After all, Egypt faces significant energy demands—in the summer of 2023 it endured significant power outages due to declined natural gas production, its primary source of electricity. Egypt contacted Russia in 2013 to renew their construction-oriented nuclear cooperation agreement, as the two countries share close ties—in 2022, Cairo’s exports to Moscow increased by 21.6% to $595.1 million whereas Moscow’s exports grew by 15.5% to $4.1 billion, and Egypt’s President Sisi has emphasized the importance of energy diversification through nuclear means, stating that “introducing nuclear energy to the energy mix is crucial to meeting the growing demand for electrical energy."

To develop its first such project, Egypt’s Electricity and Renewable Energy Minister signed a deal with the head of Rosatom in 2015 to construct the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) to generate 10% of domestic energy consumption through four 1,200 megawatt reactors. Construction for the first two units began in 2022 and anticipate being connected to the national electric grid by 2028. This project will cost $30 billion, of which $25 billion is supplied through a Russian loan whereas Egypt covers the remaining $5 billion for construction expenses, equipment imports, and specialized expertise. Cairo must begin repaying its loan in 2029 through a total of 43 semi-annual installments over 22 years at a 3% interest rate. It remains to be seen whether it can raise sufficient funds in time given its economic fragility; Egypt’s sovereign debt vulnerability is the second-highest in the world per a 2023 analysis by Bloomberg economists. Meanwhile, Russia’s ability to financially and logistically fulfill its $25 billion commitment has come under scrutiny amid international sanctions and its invasion of Ukraine.

Additionally, through El Dabaa’s Build-Own-Operate model with Rosatom, Moscow finances almost all of its construction in return for repayment on projected electricity revenues, in contrast with the Build-Operate-Transfer model in which a corporation would relinquish its control after recovering its investment. Furthermore, El Dabaa’s reactors will operate for 60 years (as per usual reactor lifetimes) with a potential of 20 additional years should Rosatom extend it. As El Dabaa’s fourth reactor’s decommissioning period is scheduled for 2110, Egypt is on track to depend on Russia for its nuclear energy for almost a century. Additionally, El Dabaa will operate on an open fuel cycle, which will further entrench its reliance on Russia. Through this arrangement, spent nuclear fuel—which is highly radioactive—will be stored temporarily on-site at El Dabaa prior to being returned to Rosatom for reprocessing or long-term storage. While this decision spares Egypt from the hefty costs of developing its own nuclear waste infrastructure, it also further deepens its asymmetric reliance on Russian technical and logistical capabilities. This creates the potential for Cairo to depend on Moscow for fuel delivery or for Rosatom to temporarily take El Dabaa offline to secure payments.

While El Dabaa has the potential to transform Egypt’s energy landscape and independence, the contract’s long-term implications raise questions. Egypt’s cooperation agreement with Russia establishes a nearly century-long relationship encompassing reactor operations, fuel supply, and waste management. El Dabaa’s open fuel cycle plans further entrench its dependence on Rosatom, and economists express concern that the arrangement could exacerbate Egypt’s existing financial challenges. Therefore, El Dabaa presents both an opportunity for energy diversification and a potential liability that could deepen Egypt’s reliance on Russian support across various domains.

What’s Next?

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Nuclear diplomacy has long been a cornerstone of Russia’s foreign policy under President Vladimir Putin. Beyond enhancing the prestige of its nuclear industry, Russia has sought to expand its nuclear agreements with other countries to evade international sanctions and policy restrictions arising from its invasion of Ukraine. SWANA states, with their increasing electricity needs, strive to diversify their related resources and bolster domestic energy independence through the promise of safe, cost-effective, robust nuclear energy. After Iran, Türkiye and Egypt began developing their first nuclear power plants in cooperation with Russia’s Rosatom corporation; although the economic and energetic benefits seem alluring, the nature of Rosatom’s Build-Own-Operate agreements with these countries raise concern about long-term dependency on Moscow for smooth facility operations. With Egypt’s existing financial challenges and Moscow’s monetary strain amid its invasion of Ukraine, economists cast doubt on whether either country can sufficiently honor its financial obligations without harming its respective economies.

Yet if the Akkuyu and El Dabaa projects are smoothly completed without many troubles, this could enable further Russian nuclear energy cooperation in the SWANA region and beyond. While states often opt for diversified partnerships, Rosatom’s success in Türkiye and Egypt would not only enhance its nuclear expertise but sway states into cooperating with this corporation. However, as Rosatom remains the sole willing supplier for states with fragile economies, the concerns of further long-term financial and administrative dependency on Russia will continue to apply to future projects in similar states seeking nuclear energy capabilities.

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