Jordanian Clan System
By Robert English
Jordanian society relies on a combination of civil, criminal and tribal practices. When the government was established in 1946, many tribes were already living in the region. In order to incorporate these groups, the new Jordanian government recruited tribal leaders to handle many local governance issues. In particular, control over some aspects of criminal and civil law were surrendered to the tribes. Several results from this have developed since 1946. By incorporating tribal structures into the Jordanian Government, state run institutions are weaker since they still rely on the tribes to administer a number of public functions. Within public services, the development of the “Wasta” system, which involves access to public services based on personal connections. Additionally, the criminal justice system still relies on tribal practices including “Jalwa” to execute state functions.
Jordanian nationalism stems primarily from a concept of “legitimacy of ruling sheik of a tribe to which all other tribes in the country have sworn allegiance”. Therefore tribes continue to play an influential role in governance, as the legitimacy of the monarchy is based on the loyalty of the tribes. Part of Jordan’s evolution since independence has been incorporating pre-existing social structures from the tribes and formalizing or rebranding them under the label of national sovereignty. Key to this development is the Wasta.
Access to public services in Jordan can vary depending on personal connections. This system of middle men, largely by familial relationships, is referred to as Wasta. The strength of the Wasta systems stems largely from the failure of the Jordanian government to provide adequate public services. Perception of Wasta is as a necessary form of access to services and opportunities otherwise unavailable. For example, in the last generation, many tribal communities slipped from the middle class to below the poverty level. During the Arab Spring protests, tribal leaders quickly became protest leaders and organizers, largely to address economic concerns. Many Jordanians have more faith in their tribal leaders than in their government. According to polling conducted in 2014, only 12% of Jordanians favored government control to the exclusion of tribal, while 59% preferred a combination of government and tribal rule. Tribes continue to play an influential role in governance, especially at the local level.
This system dispersing access to basic services has important political consequences. The Wasta system further complicates the impact of democratic reforms in Jordan. In the same 2014 survey, 75% of respondents believed elected officials respond more quickly to their tribal members than other constituents. For elected officials to be distributing state resources on behalf of their tribe leads to the state functioning as an extension of the tribal system. This dynamic harms attempts at democratic reform by undermining trust in public officials.
Within the criminal justice system of Jordan, tribes play a particularly powerful role. The practice of Jalwa, or relocation, is a common response to homicide. Precisely, Jalwa is the practice of relocating the clan of the perpetrator, in order to prevent reprisals from escalating a single murder into broader community-based violence. Jalwa is a practice widely criticized by human rights groups, primarily due to the imposition of collective punishment on people who had no control over the crime committed. This custom is a holdover from the past, largely because, as with the Wasta system, faith in Jordanian state institutions that should handle criminal prosecutions fail to do so. Omar Jazi, a Jordanian expert in constitutional law notes that “Jalwa remains a very controversial act. In one part, it is considered a norm in the tribal traditions, but it does not make any sense in a civil system. The state, not the tribe, should have the power to protect individuals in a civil state,” He goes even further noting that while civil rights and tribal law overlap in many areas, Jalwa is not one of them.
Further complicating the practice of Jalwa, sometimes government officials will step in to mediate a tribal dispute, and support Jalwa as a negotiated settlement from amongst the community. For example, after a homicide occurred in the city of Karak, dozens of the killer’s family members were forced to relocate to a neighboring province as part of a government sponsored mediation. Ministers appointed to their positions by the King of Jordan himself were present for this mediation, emphasizing the extent to which Jordanian state systems are still reliant on the tribal customs like Jalwa.
The tribal, or clan, name is many Jordanian’s first identity. The strength of tribal systems in Jordanian society influences, and sometimes undermines, the effectiveness of the Jordanian government in providing for its citizens. However, these systems did not develop in a vacuum. They were the processes by which tribal society resolved disputes and unequal access to resources for generations before the formation of the state of Jordan. Unless state capacities improve to adequately provide public services and the rule of law, the strength of these tribal systems will stay reinforced.