Room for Everyone: Syria’s ‘Guardians of Religion’
By Eelco Van Riel
Syria teems with rebel factions, militant separatists, Islamist brigades, terrorist organizations, and pro-government militias. It is a cluttered field—and a messy one. It changes perpetually: mergers, splits, defections, new alliances, diverging outlooks, different political agendas, and distinct ideologies. Some are exceedingly uncompromising; others are more moderate. Some are secessionist; others avowedly jihadist.
In the beginning of 2018, amid the rubble of a disorderly, insurgency-strewn landscape, yet another jihadist outfit surfaced. It was crowned Hurras ad-Din, that is the ‘sentinels’ or ‘Guardians of Religion’. A grand name intended to be imposing or even pompous. Their opening statement was a plea for unification, for the warring factions striving to ‘liberate’ Bilad al-Sham, that is Greater Islamic Syria, to join forces. An impressive objective, most certainly, but one doomed to fail.
To better understand the rationale for the formation of Hurras ad-Din, currently al-Qaeda’s main affiliate in northwestern Syria, we must first take a brief look at their main competitor: Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Formerly known as Jahbat al-Nusra, it was established in 2011 at the onset of the Syrian Civil War as an “expeditionary cell” of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). It swiftly gained a competitive edge on the Syrian battlefield. This caught the attention of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, then head of ISI, who was eager to expand ISI’s sphere of influence into Syria. But his attempt to reincorporate this rogue ISI offshoot failed. To avert subsumption into ISI, the Sunni Islamist group, Jahbat al-Nusra, turned to al-Qaeda. In April 2013, it pledged allegiance to its emir, Ayman al-Zawahiri. But this tenuous alliance was to be short-lived. Within three years, they parted ways. Immediately after, Abu Mohamad al-Julani, the head of Jahbat al-Nusra, announced that he would bless the jihadist outfit with a new and, to all accounts, more fitting name: Jahbat Fatah al-Sham or the Front for the Conquest of the Levant. In 2017, following a merger with a number of smaller rebel factions, the group once again changed names. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham or the ‘Organization for the Liberation of the Levant’ it was to be called.
Back to the ‘Guardians’. Disgruntled, perhaps resentful, certainly displeased. But why? For what reason? A likely explanation would be, and it is indeed the one offered by most experts and analysts, that their displeasure originated in HTS’s decision to distance itself from al-Qaeda. One astute observer, acutely aware of Syria’s faunal landscape, described it as the ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’. The eventual result: the formation of Hurras ad-Din. After all, and do recall the opening statement broadcasted upon Hurras ad-Din emergence, the former HTS jihadists favored harmony, good relations and a collective effort to disperse the troops deployed by Assad’s regime. HTS did the opposite. Further fracturing an already fractured field. Initially, the split was limited to a scattering of rebukes and reprimands. Matters took a turn for the worse upon Turkey’s military incursion into Syria in 2018. To ensure control over the territory captured by the Turkish troops, Ankara entered into a somewhat dubious alliance with HTS, the dominant insurgency group in Idlib. The tacit understanding between HTS and Turkey undoubtedly benefited HTS, but elicited angry accusations by jihadists aligned to Hurras ad-Din. HTS was faulted for their wheeling and dealing with the Turkish ‘infidels’ and denounced for breaking their oath with al-Qaeda.
Perhaps the ideological differences did indeed trigger the split. Perhaps not. Perhaps certain prominent jihadist within HTS were sidelined, demoted, and subsequently decided to defect. Credible? There are a few indicators that support this explanation. Hurras ad-Din is overseen by a circle of hardline, al-Qaeda loyalists of Jordanian descent who appear to have held a grudge against al-Julani. Simmering discontent and repeated internal quarrels and squabbles attest to this. And unlike the more pragmatic and scheming al-Julani – he violated the Islamic pledge of allegiance (bay’a) twice to assert control– the Jordanian jihadists appear less practically minded.
What is in store for the ‘Guardians of Religion’? Will they succeed or miss the boat? Are they savvy enough or will they, like the many who went before, dissolve and vanish? The future looks bleak for al-Qaeda’s outpost in Syria. HTS is remolding–desperate to rebrand. A PR campaign is currently underway to overhaul its tarnished image. Militant Islamists no longer, but administrators. Jihad a thing of the past, governance is the new catchword, and legitimacy their objective. Uncompromising fanatics, unwilling to adapt and assimilate, are liable to stir up trouble. HTS is keen to prevent this from happening and has acted the part. Since the summer of 2020, the security apparatus of HTS has conducted multiple raids against al-Qaeda targets in Idlib, thereby weakening its position. Amid the clampdowns on the ‘jihadists’, a number of senior commanders of Hurras ad-Din were arrested and detained, making for a serious blow. Does this signal the end of al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Idlib? Let us be cautious and not draw rash conclusions. HTS has not yet succeeded in its mission to defeat Hurras ad-Din–and the question at hand is will it ever? It probably still has a few cards up its sleeve. Despite the shakedown and to the chagrin of HTS leadership, it managed to pull off an attack on a Russian military base in the beginning of 2021 in Eastern Raqqa province. It is more likely that Hurras ad-Din will transform into a clandestine terrorist organization that will operate with the continued support of al-Qaeda. As much was made clear on September 11, 2021, when Ayman al-Zawahiri broadcasted a video commending Hurras ad-Din’s operation earlier that year. It seems that there is indeed room for everyone on the Syrian battlefield.