The Abraham Accords, Iran, and Security in the Middle East
By David Hamilton
A woman wearing a face mask against the coronavirus pandemic walks past United Arab Emirates, Israel and Bahraini flags in Netanya, Israel on Sept. 14, 2020. (AP)
On September 15, 2020, the United States, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Israel signed the Abraham Accords, leading to the normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain. In the following months, Sudan and Morocco also joined the normalization agreement. Since its signing, the Abraham Accords have been praised as ushering in a new era of peace, cooperation, and prosperity in the Middle East.
Such praise is certainly deserved, as the Accords have led to increased tourism and economic relations between the signatories. Moreover, diplomatic relations have also improved, with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco agreeing to open embassies in and exchange ambassadors with Israel. The UAE and Bahrain have especially improved diplomatic relations with Israel. For example, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has met with UAE Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, Bahrain Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al Khalifa, and Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa between December 2021 and February 2022. Such high-level meetings demonstrate how fast relations between the Abraham Accords signatories have advanced since September 2020.
Additionally, the Accords have facilitated greater security cooperation and collaboration between the signatories. Since the signing of the Accords, security relations between the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel have become increasingly close. In November 2021, the U.S., the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel conducted a five-day joint naval training exercise in the Red Sea. Then, in February 2022, Israeli Police Commissioner Kobi Shabtai met with senior officials from the UAE Interior Ministry to increase security cooperation and collaboration between the two countries. Furthermore, in April 2022, Israel announced the successful test of its Iron Beam laser air defense system and stated its willingness to provide the system to allies.
Perhaps the most significant change has been seen in the Israel-Bahrain relationship. On February 3, 2022, just days before the Israeli Police Commissioner’s visit to the UAE, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz made a surprise visit to Bahrain where he signed a memorandum of understanding to promote intelligence cooperation, institutionalize training, and formalize cooperation between the two countries’ militaries. Shortly afterward, Israel also announced that it would be appointing a military attache to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain.
While such developments are positive in that they demonstrate a growing willingness to engage and conduct diplomacy with Israel in the region, they present the risk of creating a dangerous security dilemma with Iran. In addition to being seen as a regional thawing of relations with Israel, the Abraham Accords have also been viewed as a growing alliance against Iran in the region. The increasing reliance on security ties to cement the relationship between the Abraham Accords signatories and Iran provides evidence for this view in Tehran. As a result, Iran might calculate that it needs to further escalate in the region and provide greater support to its proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria. Iran might also be pushed to reconsider its engagement in nuclear negotiations with the U.S., increase its research and development of ballistic missiles, and provide more funding to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Instead of fostering greater peace in the Middle East, a focus on security ties through the Abraham Accords serves to facilitate and arms race and alliance system that could drag the region into a larger conflict. Instead of engaging in Cold War-like brinksmanship and weapons build-up, Abraham Accords signatories should focus on the true strength represented by the Abraham Accords: diplomacy.
The signing of the Abraham Accords was so monumental because it represented the first normalization of relations between and Arab country and Israel since the 1990s. Instead of continuing decades of animosity, the Abraham Accords signatories came together to discuss differences, peacefully resolve conflicts, and promise to work together to solve regional issues.
Tensions with Iran should be considered one of the issues and conflicts to resolve peacefully. Through the Accords, the signatories could work together to present a stronger and more coordinated voice in talks or negotiations with Iran. The members of the Abraham Accords, along with other Gulf nations, have expressed concerns that current nuclear talks between the U.S. and Iran do not address issues such as Iran’s use of proxies in the region, IRGC interference in the domestic affairs of other nations, and Iran’s ballistic missile program. While it would be nice if the U.S. were able to include all these issues in one deal, this is unrealistic. For one, negotiators would be trying to address too many diverging topics, overly complicating the talks and reducing the likelihood of reaching a time sensitive deal. Moreover, these issues do not threaten the U.S. as much as Iran’s regional neighbors. The Abraham Accords signatories have a much larger interest and more at stake in such issues, thus they should be the main parties negotiating solutions to them.
By reaching out to Iran diplomatically, the Abraham Accords signatories would demonstrate their desire to resolve issues peacefully and avoid armed confrontation. If Iran agreed to meet with a group of Abraham Accords officials, it too would show its willingness to become a more productive neighbor in the Middle East. Peaceful engagements, along with open and honest discussion of security concerns, would help to build greater understanding between all parties involved and enable each side to take measures to mitigate the other’s fears. Through reciprocal de-escalatory actions, the threat of conflict in the region would be reduced.
Furthermore, the Abraham Accords signatories could act as mediators and facilitators between Iran and individual countries within the region. Saudi Arabia and Israel come to mind in this scenario. While Saudi Arabia and Iran have held five rounds of talks so far, only small issues like Hajj pilgrimages have been addressed. Major Saudi allies like the UAE might be better able to conduct shuttle diplomacy between Iranian and Saudi officials to facilitate solutions to more challenging issues, including Iranian support for the Houthis in Yemen and the arming of anti-government militant groups throughout the Gulf region. A bigger and more difficult goal would be getting Israel to engage with Iran. However, if Israel felt pressure from its Abraham Accords partners and noticed concrete results from diplomacy, it too might finally be convinced to entertain the idea of negotiations on key security concerns.
Only through diplomacy and honest conversation, not confrontation and arms buildups, can true peace and security be brought to the Middle East.