By Pilar Canón Ríos

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the war in Iraq, the regional balance of power in the Middle East has shifted. Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Islamic leadership arose along with differing perspectives on the regional order. While Saudi Arabia worries about Iran’s regional ambitions and its asymmetric power, especially in nuclear weapons, Teheran considers Riyadh as America’s proxy and an impediment to Iran’s rightful dominance in the Gulf. The different visions of political ideology and governance, and the sectarian and ethnic fissures deepened these tensions and continue to sharpen the division between the two countries.

The United States–attempting to take advantage of the animosity between these two States–   has adopted a strategy that places Saudi Arabia as a counterweight, an ‘Arab balancer’, against Iran in the region. Therefore, Arab Gulf countries sponsored by the United States can supervise Iranian influence in the region.

History

The animosity between Sunnis and Shias is one of the main issues of the sectarianism fight that Saudi Arabia and Iran have been dragging on for almost 44 years. When the Prophet Muhammad died in 632, a dispute emerged over who would succeed him. The Sunnis believe that the leader of the Muslim state and community would go to his friend and companion Abu Bakr. The Shias believe that Ali, the cousin of the Prophet Muhammad, should succeed him. Shia means “followers of Ali”. They developed a doctrine that Ali and his successors were infallible representatives of God. He was error-free. The Sunnis never agreed to this.

The Iranian revolution in 1979 was a crucial event for the Muslim world, and it is believed to be the beginning of direct tensions that will endure until today. Before 1979, Islam as a political phenomenon was a marginal idea in the region. The Arab world was all about socialism and Arab nationalism, and Iran was dominated by secular forces. Now, once Khomeini started the revolution, Islam is squarely in the middle of the table in the Middle East.

Both Sunnis and Shias were celebrating this event. Khomeini’s initial line did not follow a sectarian path but sent an anti-American message.

Since the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini used religion to reorder every aspect of Iranian life. He declared that Islam was fundamentally opposed to the whole notion of monarchy. His message was a direct assault on kings from the Gulf states to Saudi Arabia.  From now on, Sharia will govern Iran. A cleric that receives his authority from God should rule as its head, and Imams, who are directly connected to God, are the ones leading on the right path. With this, political Islam entered Iran.

The fact that Khomeini was a Shia ruler was the limit of his power, and it is that limit that the Saudis, Pakistanis, Egyptians, and Jordanians used to make sure the Iranian revolution did not spread. It was a challenge to the leadership of the Islamic world, and to the royal House of Saud.

Different confrontations in the region in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria have served Iran and Saudi Arabia to alienate themselves respectively with actors which might sympathize with their cause or that could be beneficial in getting closer to their final goal: to be the dominant power in the region. Both countries blame each other for the tensions experienced over these past years. The Foreign Minister of Iran made this statement in an interview with PBS: “Saudis helped Saddam Hussein for eight years. Saudis helped Al Qaeda. Saudis created Daesh. Saudis created Al Nusra. Saudis are funding terrorists who are operating in eastern Iraq. So, they started this sectarian message. Not us”. For the same channel, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia answered this Iranian declaration arguing: “The Iranians are the ones who are exporting terrorism. They are the ones stocking the fires of sectarianism. They are the ones who are violating international laws and norms, and acceptable behavior. And the ones who have been on an aggressive path since 1979”

Implications of the disputes

The Saudis have put a lot of pressure on the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in response to a growing dispute between Tehran and Riyadh with the intention of exploiting it for their political objectives. This is primarily due to the nuclear agreement that major world powers negotiated with Iran in 2015, which left Tehran with a relative feeling of satisfaction and Riyadh with total discontent. For Saudi Arabia, the isolation of Iran became priority number one, even if that meant dividing the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia has been using its financial influence to exert leverage on countries like Somalia or Bahrain to cut ties with Iran. Lebanon, which refused to support the anti-Iranian resolution, has seen financial aid from Riyadh cut. As a result of this tactic, inter-sectarian rifts within the OIC have deepened and Iran has been isolated.

The 2016 OIC meeting held in April did not promote any kind of mutual understanding or trust between Sunnis and Shi’as. After the execution of the Shiite Muslim cleric Sheik Nimr al-Nimr Riyadh carried out, and the attack on Saudi Embassy in Teheran in 2016, Saudi Arabia, and Iran remained antagonists in almost every issue concerning the region. During that year, the relationship between these two countries continued deteriorating, and they kept accusing each other of waging a proxy war for regional control.

The Iranian-Saudi Arabia rivalry had serious security, economic and political implications in the region. The main effects can be summarised in three points: the nuclear file, the war in Yemen, and the war in Syria.

After the negotiations between Iran and major world powers--the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany–on this nuclear agreement, and the exclusion of Saudi Arabia from this matter, tensions continued escalating. Iran agreed to stop the advance of its nuclear program and open its facilities to international inspections in exchange for relief from international sanctions, which starved its economy, and the lift of the weapon embargo. This deal was supposed to help prevent Iran from developing a wider nuclear program and reduce the prospect of tensions and confrontation between Iran and its regional rivals, Saudi Arabia, who expressed its disconformity for not having been included in the talks, and Israel.

The success of the agreement was at risk when Trump decided to withdraw the agreement and reinstate sanctions in 2018. In consequence, Iran began to surpass the low-enriched uranium stockpile restrictions that had been set, and the uranium was enriching in higher concentrations. However, this increment was not enough for the development of weapons. Since this moment, Iran continues to take steps away from the agreement building a centrifuge production center to replace the one that was destroyed in an attack, the parliament approved a law for the boost in uranium enrichment, and the following year Iran announced a restriction on the inspections of their facilities.

But the agreement’s implications were beyond the nuclear threat. Some of Iran’s neighbors expected the deal to be an asset for Iran to continue interfering in the politics of other countries in the region, such as Syria and Yemen. Realizing the end of the restrictions on Teheran will give Iran billions of dollars that could strengthen its economic and military capacity and expand its regional influence in the region. Saudis saw this agreement as an act of approval from the US for Iran’s nuclear program. After this, Saudi Arabia announced the implementation of a nuclear program to counter Iran’s proliferation of nuclear weapons. The mistrust and the hiding political interest of Teheran and Riyadh exacerbated the fear of a nuclear war in the region, especially, taking into account the numerous unstable forces that dominate the current arena, and the escalation of tensions that might result in fragmentation of the region.

The Yemen War is one of the most stemmed conflicts in the region and one where Saudi Arabia and Iran fight each other indirectly. The rivalry between these countries is prolonging the Yemen war, which is generating devastating effects on the country whose population is suffering the consequences. Saudi Arabia aims to protect its oil fields against Houthi rebels and the control of the Bab-Mandab strait. Meanwhile, Iran offers financial support, resources, and weaponry to hold western trade and Saudi Arabia as hostages emitting continuous threats along the strait. The war in Yemen is complex and confronts many factions and different groups in the country. Although it is not subject to Saudi Arabia-Iranian rivalry (the Houthis are still an autonomous actor inside of Yemen) this confrontation plays a role in this war affecting the whole region.  

Syria has been another regional actor that has experienced the impact of the animosity between these two countries. Since almost the beginning of the Syrian war, the conflict experienced external patronage of local actors transforming it into a proxy war. Iran and Saudi Arabia have been supporting and defending their own interest in the conflict.  Iran has backed the government of Bashar al-Assad while Saudi Arabia has been supporting the opposition. For both of them, the Syrian conflict was never about Syrian interest but a battle for regional hegemony. Riyadh saw in Syria the opportunity to reverse the post-20003 regional order and to put an end to Iran’s influence in Syria, which could lead to weakening Iran’s influence in Lebanon and Iraq. The Syrian opposition supported this strategy and looked for a realignment far from Iran if Assad was toppled. In this context, Iran saw the threat this will pose to its power in the region and in its country. However, in this conflict, Iran’s main threat was not Saudi Arabia but US-Israeli ambitions seeking to use conflict in Syria to weaken its position and revert regional order in the Islamic Republic.

In 2021 Iran and Saudi Arabia met four times in Baghdad and once in the UN General Assembly in New York. This means the diplomatic channels are starting to open again since 2016 when the relationship got frozen. This could benefit both countries in different areas. Iran has a great interest in broadening regional trade relations. Saudi Arabia, the second largest country in the region, seems to be a useful business partner for Iran, whose economy is battered. Also, this rapprochement would send the message to the region that Iran is a key power in the Middle East that must be taken into consideration. Saudi Arabia, for the most part, is prioritizing its security and economic interest. The country aims to attract serious investment into the kingdom after the United States withdraws from Afghanistan, which indicates that the western country is no longer supporting the protection of its partners in the region. Reducing the hostilities with Iran will benefit this goal.  In July 2022 both have a mutual interest in continuing with the talks.

For more than 40 years, the confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia has shaken the Middle East and had detrimental consequences for the entire region. The clashes between Iran and Saudi Arabia frequently involved other Middle Eastern countries. The direct confrontations are not taking place on the ground of any of these two states. The use of external conflicts involving third actors, threats, financial support, the presence of the US, and extremist activities constantly leads to the destabilization of the region which translates into long-term wars, and thousands of casualties and exacerbate the confrontation between groups such as Sunnis and Shiites. The struggle for power and dominance in the region is the main reason Teheran and Riyadh have been fighting over these years. A new era in the relationship between these two states seems to be about to start, however, it is too soon to confirm if it will officially be the end of the rivalry.