By Benjamin Lutz

In the eyes of the Erdogan regime, Libya is now an ever-increasing important partner in the security and maintenance of Mediterranean-area affairs. Turkey has been enhancing its relationship with the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) of Libya, headed by Fayez al-Sarraj. Most notably, in November of 2019, the two countries signed two bilateral agreements: the “Restriction of Marine Jurisdictions” agreement and the “Memorandum of Understanding on Security and Military Cooperation.” These two agreements monumentally change the dynamic of the Mediterranean region.

Turkey’s engagement in the Mediterranean has ramped up extensively in the recent years. Finding a solid partner in Libya, the GNA and al-Sarraj has allowed Erdogan to widen Turkey’s influence in the region. The Eastern Mediterranean is dominated by Egypt, Greece, Greek Cyprus, and Israel — who all are quite wary of this newfound renewal of relations between Turkey and Libya; especially as the GNA is still finding its footing in international and domestic legitimacy and negotiations.

In a wider sense, the European Union and the United States, alongside the Eastern Mediterranean countries, have all deemed this bilateral agreement as illegal. However, Russia has been a firm supporter, working alongside Turkey to establish a peaceful (and business friendly) Libya. Even though Russia and Turkey have supported opposing sides of the Libyan conflict, the joint efforts to collaborate on energy, oil, and development in Libya is a clear sign that Russia accepts this agreement. Territorially, this joint maritime border has massively enhanced Turkey’s reach in the Mediterranean, especially in the creation of the joint Cyprus-Greece-Israel oil pipeline slated for construction 2022–2025, as the pathway now overlaps with Turkey’s expanded maritime border.

Furthermore, as the military conflict in Libya continues, Turkey has been instrumental in the recent talks (hosted in Moscow) towards a ceasefire agreement between the parties in Libya. Although unsuccessful, Turkey’s diplomatic prowess in organizing these talks alongside Russia cannot be understated. Both Moscow and Ankara, though on opposing sides of the Libyan conflict, have become immeasurably influential in the conflict, both diplomatically and militarily.

Erdogan has sent soldiers to Libya to fight on the behalf of the GNA against the forces of General Khalifa Haftar, whose claim to the Libyan government is supported by Russia, France, Egypt, Jordan, and others. However, Turkey is adamant about protecting and supporting the Libyan government by al-Sarraj and the GNA and has vowed to “teach Haftar the lesson he deserves.” This sentiment comes off the heels of the Moscow ceasefire attempt as both al-Sarraj and Haftar attended the negotiations but only al-Sarraj agreed and signed to the deal. Officials from the GNA have expressed anger that their allies, other than Turkey, have effectively abandoned them since Haftar declared his intention to capture Tripoli last April.

In mid-January, Germany will host the newest round of peace talks but the inflammatory language from Erdogan coinciding with the rise of anti-Turkish sentiment may affect the success of the peace process. Regardless of the outcome of the German-led reconciliation initiative between al-Sarraj and Haftar, Turkey has undoubtedly become a major player in the future of Libya, both in its geographic importance in the Mediterranean and its political process in overcoming its internal conflict.